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I.  INTRODUCTION 
High school can be a challenging time for many teenagers.  They are faced with 
the challenge of developing into independent young adults, while being subjected to 
constant authoritative control and scrutiny.  Teenagers are even subject to 
authoritative supervision outside of the home by such figures as schoolteachers, 
guidance counselors, athletic coaches, and student group advisors.  In many cases, 
230 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 18:229 
these adult authority figures are in a relationship of trust and confidence with the 
students, often to a degree where the adult is seen as a surrogate parent or role 
model.  
In such relationships, how would most students react if asked by these authority 
figures to submit to a suspicionless1 drug test?  Would the students feel that someone 
they trust and admire is accusing them of wrongdoing, and feel that they must 
vindicate themselves by passing the test?2  Would the students be afraid to assert 
their right not to take the test out of fear of being seen as deceptive?   
In an effort to battle adolescent drug use, many school districts have implemented 
drug-testing programs that focus on certain groups of students without any 
particularized suspicion of drug use by any of the individual students.  Schools 
obtain consent to these programs by conditioning participation in certain activities on 
passing the drug test.  For example, many schools condition participation in 
interscholastic athletics on passing a drug test.3  Some schools also condition 
participation in any competitive, interscholastic activity, such as band or choir, on 
passing a drug test.4   
Although the Supreme Court of the United States5 has specifically addressed and 
upheld these latter examples,6 schools have implemented drug-testing programs in 
other contexts as well.  For example, Groveport Madison, a public high school in 
Groveport, Ohio, recently adopted a policy that requires all students applying for an 
on-campus parking permit to pass an initial drug test, and to also submit to a monthly 
random drawing of students to be tested.7  This program requires students to pay an 
                                                                
1BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) defines suspicion as “the apprehension or 
imagination of the existence of something wrong based only on inconclusive or slight 
evidence, or possibly even no evidence.”  Therefore, public school drug-testing programs are 
referred to as suspicionless because they are preventive in nature; they do not focus on 
individual students based on any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing.  Instead, they focus 
on a large group of students, such as athletes, and test for multiple illicit drugs and alcohol in 
order to deter drug use before it even begins. 
2FATEMA GUNJA, ALEXANDRA COX, MARSHA ROSENBAUM, PHD & JUDITH APPEL, J.D., 
MAKING SENSE OF STUDENT DRUG TESTING: WHY EDUCATORS ARE SAYING NO (2004) 
available at http://www.drugtesting-fails.org/pdf/drug-testing-booklet.pdf.  This publication 
argues that student-teacher relationships can be undermined when teachers or coaches “act as 
confidants in some circumstances, but as police in others,” which may circumvent trust and 
cause students to feel “ashamed and resentful.”  Id. at 8. 
3See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
4See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
5Hereinafter referred to as “Supreme Court.” 
6See Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; Earls, 536 U.S. 822.  The balancing test established by the 
Supreme Court to determine the legality of a particular school’s drug-testing program will be 
discussed under Section II: Case-Law Background. 
7Bill Bush, Groveport Madison; Students Must Pass Drug Test to Park, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Aug. 28, 2004, at 1A; Mike Harden, Principal Takes Wrong Turn in Instituting 
Drug-Test Rule, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 31, 2004, at 1B [hereinafter Harden, Drug-Test 
Rule]; Mike Harden, Parking Policy Doesn’t Deserve Bad Reputation, Principal Says, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 5, 2004, at 1B [hereinafter Harden, Parking Policy]. 
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annual fee of $26, and has been attributed with causing the number of students 
applying for on-campus parking permits to decrease by 25% from the previous year.8  
The school’s first random test yielded three positive results for marijuana out of 37 
samples.9  Students who fail the test are punished with a three-week suspension of 
parking privileges and are required to undergo counseling.10 
The Groveport Madison program has produced mixed feelings among the local 
community.  Columbus Dispatch reporter Mike Harden quoted Groveport Madison 
Principal Mike Beck as saying that, early in the program’s existence, he estimated 
parental support for the program as being “70-30 for.”11  However, the program has 
upset at least one parent.  Ken Dustheimer, whose daughter attended Groveport 
Madison at the time, lodged a complaint concerning the program’s legality with the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio.12  Although the ACLU of Ohio 
has not taken any formal legal action regarding the program, Gary Daniels, 
Litigation Coordinator and spokesman for the ACLU of Ohio, stated that “[the 
program] definitely raises constitutional concerns.”13  
This note will address the concerns raised by suspicionless drug-testing programs 
in public high schools by ultimately arguing that public policy considerations should 
be factored into the Supreme Court’s balancing test,14 and that such considerations 
will weigh the balance against expanding drug-testing programs to contexts beyond 
those already upheld by the Supreme Court.15  At the least, this note will argue that 
the Groveport Madison drug-testing program, imposed on students applying for on-
campus parking privileges, should not be upheld.   However, before this argument 
can be properly asserted, a number of pertinent topics must be discussed.   
Section II of this note will begin by discussing the primary Supreme Court 
cases16 that address certain legal issues relevant to drug-testing programs.17  This 
                                                                
8Bush, supra note 7. 
9Harden, Parking Policy, supra note 7. 
10
 Bush, supra note 7; Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7. 
11Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7. 
12Harden, Parking Policy, supra note 7. 
13Bush, supra note 7; Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7. 
14As previously stated, the Supreme Court’s balancing test, which is used to determine the 
legality of public high school drug-testing programs, will be fully discussed under Section II: 
Case-Law Background, infra. 
15The contexts already considered and upheld by the Supreme Court involve programs 
imposed on interscholastic athletics and competitive extra-curricular activities.  See generally 
Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; Earls, 536 U.S. 822. 
16This note focuses only on federal case law developed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.  Individual states retain the authority to impose their own guidelines, provided 
they do not conflict with the guidelines established by the Supreme Court.  In doing so, states 
are allowed to be more expansive of individual rights, and can provide greater restrictions on 
school drug-testing programs than what federal case law does.  See GUNJA et al., supra note 2, 
at 11. 
17Such legal issues include: 1) whether the protections afforded in the Bill of Rights apply 
to public high school students; 2) whether a drug test conducted via urinalysis constitutes a 
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section will also discuss the cases specifically addressing drug-testing programs, 
including those implemented by public high schools.18  Section III of this note will 
apply the Supreme Court’s balancing test to the Groveport Madison program.  
Section IV of this note will analyze certain public policy considerations according to 
their relevant factors in the Supreme Court’s balancing test.19  In conclusion, this 
note will argue that such public policy considerations weigh the Supreme Court’s 
balancing test against the program implemented by Groveport Madison, and that 
high school drug-testing programs should be limited to those contexts already 
specifically upheld by the Court.     
II.  CASE-LAW BACKGROUND 
Some preliminary issues must be addressed before directly discussing the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of public high school drug-testing programs.  First, this 
Section will discuss the applicability of the Bill of Rights and, specifically, the 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,20 to public high school students.  
Second, this Section will review certain areas of a Fourth Amendment analysis.  
These areas include: 1) the types of privacy expectations protected by the Fourth 
Amendment; 2) whether a drug test conducted via urinalysis constitutes a search and 
seizure that is covered by the Fourth Amendment; and 3) the standards of suspicion 
that must be met in particular instances for the government to justify a search.  
Finally, this Section will review the Supreme Court’s analysis of suspicionless drug-
testing programs, including those implemented by public high schools. 
A.  Public High School Students Retain Constitutional Rights 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme 
Court held that three high school students’ right to freedom of expression was 
violated by the school district when it indefinitely suspended the students for 
wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.21  In dicta, the 
Court stated that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
                                                          
search and seizure that must satisfy a Fourth Amendment analysis; and 3) the standards of 
suspicion that the government must satisfy in order to justify a search. 
18See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding a 
suspicionless drug-testing program imposed on certain railway employees); Nat’l Treasury 
Employees’ Union v. Von Raab, 589 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding a suspicionless drug-testing 
program imposed on certain U.S. Customs service employees); Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; 
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (striking a mandatory drug-testing program on all 
candidates for State office); Earls, 536 U.S. 822. 
19These public policy considerations will be categorized according to their relevant 
factor(s) in the Court’s balancing test because it is the format in which they should be 
considered when formally applying the test to a particular drug-testing program. 
20Hereinafter referred to as the “Fourth Amendment.” 
21Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969).  The Court 
found that the students’ manner of expression did not substantially disrupt or materially 
interfere with school activities or the rights of other students, which is the standard applicable 
to determining whether school officials may exercise a content-based restriction.  The failure 
to satisfy this standard mandates a strict scrutiny analysis, which finds content-based 
restrictions presumptively unconstitutional.  Id. 
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speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”22  Further, “state-operated schools 
may not be enclaves of totalitarianism,”23 and “students . . . are ‘persons’ under our 
Constitution . . . . [t]hey are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must 
respect.”24  Additionally, the Court stated that one objective of our nation’s schools is 
to educate students for citizenship, which is “reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to . . . teach the youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”25 
Subsequently, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court applied a Fourth 
Amendment analysis when it upheld a school official’s search of a female student’s 
purse.26  Before concluding that this search was reasonable,27 the Court inquired as to 
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by public school 
officials.28  The Court declared that it is an indisputable proposition that the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution29 “‘prohibits unreasonable searches 
and seizures by state officers,’”30 and it is “equally indisputable . . . that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students against encroachment by 
public school officials.”31  In support of this proposition, the Court stated that schools 
act according to “publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies;”32 and, 
therefore, “school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as 
surrogates for the parents.”33    
                                                                
22Id. at 506.  
23Id. at 511. 
24Id. 
25Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
26New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1984).  After a female high school student was 
discovered smoking cigarettes in the girls’ restroom, the assistant vice principal conducted a 
search of her purse in pursuit of evidence of this school violation.  The search revealed a pack 
of cigarettes, a pack of rolling papers, a small amount of marijuana, a smoking pipe, some 
empty plastic bags, a large sum of money, and an index card displaying a list of other students 
that were indebted to her.  The school subsequently turned this evidence over to the police, 
and juvenile delinquency charges were brought against her.  Id. at 328-29.   
27The Supreme Court’s analysis in concluding that the search was reasonable will be fully 
discussed in Section II, Subsection B, Part 4, which specifically addresses the standard used 
for reviewing school searches based on reasonable suspicion.     
28Id. at 333-37. 
29The Fourteenth Amendment has provided the means for particular Amendments 
contained in the Bill of Rights to directly regulate state action that undermines those rights 
seen as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 
(1937).  The Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the states by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). 
30T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)). 
31T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334. 
32Id. at 336. 
33Id. 
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B.  The Fourth Amendment Scrutiny 
The Text of the Fourth Amendment reads:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Despite the apparent clarity of this language, its application in particular 
instances has been quite controversial.  For example, it is not always clear what types 
of expectations of privacy are protected, or what types of searches must satisfy a 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  Additionally, case law has created some exceptions to 
the requirement of a warrant based on probable cause, thereby allowing a search to 
be supported by either reasonable suspicion or less in certain circumstances.34  
Accordingly, this subsection will discuss the types of privacy expectations protected 
by the Fourth Amendment, whether a urinalysis constitutes a search and seizure that 
must pass constitutional muster, and the relevant standards of suspicion that officials 
must have in particular instances before conducting a search.35 
1.  Privacy expectations that society recognizes as reasonable 
The Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment does not protect all 
expectations of privacy, but instead only protects reasonable expectations of 
privacy.36  In Smith v. Maryland,37 the Court adopted a two-part rule, originally 
addressed by Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz,38 which is to be utilized in 
determining whether an asserted expectation of privacy is reasonable.  First, one 
must show an actual, subjective expectation of privacy by attempting to protect 
something as private.39  Second, one must show that the subjective expectation of 
                                                                
34See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), (allowing police officers to conduct a brief 
frisk of an individual’s clothing when circumstances give the officer reasonable suspicion that 
the individual is carrying a weapon that may be used to harm the officer, regardless of whether 
the officer has probable cause to arrest the individual). 
35This discussion is by no means exhaustive of the particular instances in which the Fourth 
Amendment applies.  This discussion only covers those areas most relevant to the main topic 
of the note—suspicionless drug-testing programs in public high schools. 
36See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347, 352 (1967) (finding a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a public telephone booth) (“One who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door 
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that 
the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world”); Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s 
prison cell) (“We hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any expectation 
of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell”). 
37442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
38Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring). 
39Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 361) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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privacy is one the public is prepared to accept as reasonable, which is satisfied when, 
viewed objectively, the expectation is justifiable under the circumstances.40   
In Smith, the Court found that the defendant did not allege a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers dialed from his home telephone.  
This information was not the subject of an actual, subjective expectation of privacy 
because, as the Court found to be obvious to all telephone subscribers, the telephone 
company recorded the information for legitimate business purposes.41  Additionally, 
the Court found that society would not accept this expectation of privacy as 
reasonable because the information was voluntarily turned over to the telephone 
company.42 
2.  Urinalysis constitutes a search and seizure 
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, the Supreme Court upheld 
a Federal Railway Administration policy of imposing mandatory blood and urine 
tests on employees involved in certain train accidents and based on a supervisor’s 
reasonable suspicion, and discretionary breath and urine tests for employees who 
violate certain safety rules.43 As a preliminary matter, however, the Court addressed 
whether a urinalysis test constitutes a search and seizure that must satisfy a Fourth 
Amendment analysis.44  The Court found that “the collection and testing of urine 
intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as 
reasonable,” which mandates the conclusion that urinalysis testing be subject to 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.45 
3.  Warrants and probable cause 
The Fourth Amendment does not protect the people against all searches, but only 
against unreasonable searches.46  Therefore, government officials can conduct a 
                                                                
40Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 361) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
41Id. at 742-44. 
42Id.  
43Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).  The Court’s 
analysis in upholding the FRA policy will be discussed under Section II, subsection C, Part 1, 
which specifically addresses the standard used for reviewing suspicionless searches. 
44Id. at 613-17. 
45In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court quoted Nat’l Treasury Employees Union 
v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987) (upholding a U.S. Customs Service policy of 
testing all employees that apply for, and are appointed to, certain positions), aff’d, Nat’l 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) where the Fifth Circuit stated 
that: 
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of 
urine.  Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all.  It is a 
function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance 
in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom. 
46See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652 (“The Fourth Amendment . . . provides that the Federal 
Government shall not violate ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’”  (quoting the text of the 
Fourth Amendment) (emphasis added)). 
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search if it qualifies as reasonable, according to a Fourth Amendment analysis.  
However, different circumstances lead to different determinations of what constitutes 
a reasonable search.   
Ordinarily, searches conducted by law enforcement agents in pursuit of evidence 
of criminal activity require a judicial warrant based on probable cause, unless exigent 
(emergency) circumstances exist that excuse the warrant requirement.47  The few 
exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless search include such situations as 
when officers are in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon,48 and when officers have a 
reasonable belief that evidence is being destroyed.49  Even in the absence of such 
exigent circumstances, police officers are permitted to conduct a warrantless search 
of automobiles when they have probable cause to believe the automobile contains 
evidence of criminal activity.50  However, the Court has stated that the probable 
cause requirement is “‘peculiarly related to criminal investigations’ and may be 
unsuited to determining the reasonableness of administrative searches where the 
‘Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions.’”51  High 
school drug-testing programs fall under this category—school searches are 
administrative searches, and the drug-testing programs aim to deter drug abuse 
before it becomes an epidemic.  Therefore, school officials are not imposed with the 
burden of having to obtain either a judicial warrant or probable cause before 
conducting a search.  
4.  Reasonable suspicion in public schools 
In T.L.O., the Supreme Court upheld the assistant vice principal’s search of a 
female high school student’s purse even though the official did not have probable 
cause and a warrant was not secured prior to conducting the search.52  First, the Court 
held that “school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who 
                                                                
47See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20  (“[T]he police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance 
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure . . . in most instances 
failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent 
circumstances”).   
48See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (upholding the police officers’ entrance 
into a home while in pursuit of a robbery suspect who, only a few minutes before the officers’ 
entrance, had entered the home himself); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) 
(upholding the police officers’ entrance into a suspected drug dealer’s home immediately after 
the officers witnessed her retreat into the home only minutes after they arrested an individual 
who provided an undercover agent with drugs that the arrestee alleged to have obtained from 
the female suspect). 
49See Vasquez v. United States, 454 U.S. 975 (1981) (upholding the police officers’ 
entrance into an apartment out of fear that individuals inside the apartment would destroy any 
and all evidence of drug trafficking after the officers had just arrested several others outside of 
the apartment for their involvement in drug activity). 
50See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (upholding the police officers’ 
warrantless search of a mobile home when the officers had probable cause that contraband was 
contained therein). 
51Earls, 536 U.S. at 828 (quoting Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656, 667-68 (1989)) (emphasis in original). 
52T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347-48. 
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is under their authority.”53  In support of this, the Court stated that search warrants 
are unsuited to the school environment because they “interfere with the maintenance 
of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”54 
Further, the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the 
schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on 
probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the 
law.55  Instead, “the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the 
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”56  Such an inquiry 
mandates the application of a two-pronged test.57 
The first prong demands a determination of whether the search was initially 
justified, which is satisfied when the school official has reasonable suspicion the 
search will reveal evidence of a violation of either the law or school rules.58  In this 
case, the assistant vice principal actually conducted two searches that the Supreme 
Court had to consider: the initial search of the student’s purse in pursuit of evidence 
that she had been smoking on school grounds, which was a violation of school rules, 
and the subsequent search for evidence of drug possession, which was a violation of 
the law.59  The assistant vice principal’s initial search for cigarettes was justified 
because the student was observed smoking cigarettes in the girls’ restroom, which 
provoked a reasonable suspicion that a search of her purse would reveal cigarettes, 
possession of which would constitute evidence of violating school rules.60  The Court 
found the subsequent search for evidence of drug possession to be justified because 
the initial search uncovered rolling papers, which provoked a reasonable suspicion 
that a more extensive search of the student’s purse would uncover drugs, possession 
of which would constitute a violation of the law.61 
The second prong inquires as to whether the search as actually conducted was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the search, 
                                                                
53Id. at 340. 
54Id. 
55Id. at 341.  
56Id.  
57T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
58Id. at 341-42. 
59While looking for evidence of cigarette smoking, the Assistant Vice Principal discovered 
rolling papers, which he knew to be popular for rolling marijuana cigarettes.  This discovery 
prompted the Assistant Vice Principal to search further for evidence of drug use.  Id. at 328. 
60Id. at 345-46.  “A teacher had reported that T.L.O. was smoking in the lavatory.  
Certainly this report gave [the official] reason to suspect that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes 
with her; and if she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in which to find 
them.” 
61Id. at 347.  “The discovery of the rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse.  This 
suspicion justified further exploration of T.L.O.’s purse, which turned up more evidence of 
drug-related activities . . . under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the 
search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse.”   
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which requires the search to not be excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex 
of the student and the nature of the alleged violation.62  Without explanation, the 
Court did not specifically address this prong.  Instead, the Court only addressed the 
inconsistency between its analysis of the first prong and the lower court’s ruling 
regarding the reasonableness of the search, without any comment as to why it failed 
to apply the second prong.63 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Analysis of Suspicionless Drug-Testing Programs 
1.  Suspicionless drug-testing programs in general 
The Supreme Court has reviewed the constitutionality of drug-testing programs 
imposed by certain governmental agencies without any particularized suspicion of 
drug use by the individuals being tested.  In Skinner, the Court upheld a Federal 
Railway Administration (FRA) policy of imposing mandatory blood and urine tests 
on employees involved in certain train accidents and based on a supervisor’s 
reasonable suspicion of substance abuse, and discretionary breath and urine tests for 
employees who violated certain safety rules. 64  First, the Court stated that a search 
does not require a warrant or probable cause when the government can show 
“‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, [that] make the 
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.’”65  In this case, the FRA 
possessed special needs to dispense with the warrant and probable cause 
requirements for two reasons.  First, FRA employees are involved in a highly safety-
sensitive profession, which creates an extreme need to prevent drug and alcohol 
impairment by the employees.66  Second, requiring either a warrant or probable cause 
would place a heavy burden on obtaining this type of evidence because of the 
constant rate at which drugs and alcohol are eliminated from the bloodstream.67   
The Court conceded that, even when a warrant or probable cause is not required, 
“‘some quantum of individualized suspicion’” might be required.68  However, “in 
limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are 
minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion 
                                                                
62Id. at 341-42. 
63This author cannot offer any explanation or accurate speculation for the Court’s failure 
to specifically address the second prong in its analysis of whether the assistant vice principal’s 
search of the student’s purse was constitutional.   
64Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609-12. 
65Id. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting T.L.O., 469 
U.S. at 351) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding a 
probation officer’s search of a probationer’s home based on less than probable cause, because 
of the special needs of operating a system of supervision over probationers)). 
66Id. at 619-24. 
67Id. 
68Id. at 624 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) 
(upholding the government’s practice of stopping cars at reasonably located checkpoints along 
the border and questioning their occupants about immigration status without any 
individualized suspicion)).  
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would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search 
may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.”69 
In this case, the Court found that FRA employees had a minimal expectation of 
privacy because of their “participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to 
ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of 
covered employees.”70  Further, the toxicology samples were collected in a medical 
environment under conditions similar to a regular physical examination, and the 
information was obtained for the limited purpose of detecting substance abuse.71  
Each of these factors contributed to the Court’s finding that the program implicated 
only upon limited expectations of privacy.72 
Regarding the governmental interest furthered by the intrusion, the Court stated, 
“[the] Government interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion 
is compelling.”73  This is because “a requirement of particularized suspicion of drug 
or alcohol use would seriously impede an employer’s ability to obtain this 
information [evidence of impairment due to substance abuse], despite its obvious 
importance.”74  Because the Court found that the interests served by the drug-testing 
program outweighed the employees’ privacy concerns, the Court held that the FRA’s 
policy did not require any particularized suspicion in order to impose a drug and 
alcohol test on employees who violated certain safety rules or were involved in 
certain train accidents.75 
The same day the Supreme Court decided Skinner, the Court decided National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.76  This case involved a U.S. Customs 
Service policy of imposing a mandatory drug test on employees holding, applying 
for, or being appointed to any position that satisfied one of three criteria: those 
directly involved in drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws, those required 
to carry a firearm, and those required to handle classified material.77  
In following the principle utilized in Skinner, the Court in Von Raab stated that, 
where the government can show special needs, “beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against 
the Government’s interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant 
or some level of individualized suspicion.”78  In this case, the Government did 
present a special need to justify dispensing with such requirements because of its 
substantial interest to “deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive 
positions within the [U.S. Customs] Service and to prevent the promotion of drug 
                                                                
69Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. 
70Id. at 627. 
71Id. at 626. 
72Id. at 628. 
73Id. 
74489 U.S. at 631. 
75Id. at 633. 
76Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
77Id. at 660-61. 
78Id. at 665-66. 
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users to those positions.”79  Further, the Service’s “mission would be compromised if 
[the Service] were required to seek search warrants in connection with routine, yet 
sensitive, employment decisions.”80 
After finding that the government possessed special needs that dispense with the 
warrant and probable cause requirements, the Court found that “the Government’s 
need to conduct the suspicionless searches required by the Customs program 
outweigh[ed] the privacy interests of employees engaged directly in drug 
interdiction, and of those who otherwise [were] required to carry firearms.”81  The 
Court first found that the Government had a compelling interest to prevent “front-
line interdiction personnel” from engaging in drug use because the “national interest 
in self-protection could be irreparably damaged if those charged with safeguarding it 
were, because of their own drug use, unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting 
narcotics.”82  Regarding those employees required to carry a firearm, the Court found 
that “the public should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from 
impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to positions where they may 
need to employ deadly force.”83   
Next, the Court balanced these legitimate governmental interests against the 
employees’ privacy interests implicated by the search.84  The Court found that U.S. 
Customs Service employees directly involved with drug interdiction, as well as those 
who carry a firearm, “reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness 
and probity . . . because successful performance of their duties depends uniquely on 
their judgment and dexterity.”85  Therefore, such employees have a diminished 
expectation of privacy.  Based on the foregoing, the Court concluded that the 
Government’s compelling interests in the safety and integrity of our nation’s borders 
outweighed the relevant employees’ diminished expectations of privacy, which 
justified imposition of a drug-testing program in the absence of individualized 
suspicion.86 
In Chandler v. Miller,87 the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a 
drug-testing program imposed by the State of Georgia on all candidates seeking 
                                                                
79Id. at 666. 
80Id. at 667. 
81Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668. 
82Id. at 670. 
83Id. at 671. 
84Id. 
85Id. at 672. 
86489 U.S at 679.  The Court failed to analyze the drug-testing program as applied to 
employees in positions that required handling of classified information because the record was 
found to be inadequate for that purpose.  Id. 
87Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).  This case was decided after the Supreme Court 
decided its first case reviewing the constitutionality of a high school drug-testing program, 
Vernonia.  Some confusion might arise because of the placement of this case out of 
chronological order.  However, in order to clearly present the principles established for 
reviewing the constitutionality of high school drug-testing programs, the two cases that 
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nomination or election to state office.  The Georgia statute required each candidate to 
present a certificate from a state-approved laboratory indicating that the candidate 
submitted to and passed a urinalysis drug test within the 30 days prior to qualifying 
for nomination or election.88 
In beginning its analysis, the Court reinforced the principle that some searches do 
not require a warrant or probable cause when the Government can show “special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” that dispense with these 
requirements.89  After showing that it has such special needs, the Government is not 
obliged to show any individualized suspicion when it can satisfy a context-specific 
inquiry that examines the competing private and public interests advanced by the 
parties.90   
In addressing the preliminary inquiry, the State of Georgia contended it had the 
requisite special needs solely because of its sovereign power, reserved to the states 
under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to establish qualifications for 
state office candidates.91  The Court rejected this contention, however, after finding 
that “no precedent [existed] suggesting that a State’s power to establish 
qualifications for state offices—any more than its power to prosecute crime—
diminishes the constraints on state action imposed by the Fourth Amendment.”92  
Consequently, the Court used the principles established in Skinner,93 Von Raab,94 and 
Vernonia School District v. Acton95 in determining whether the State of Georgia 
possessed such special needs.96 
In analyzing this factor, the Court found the Government’s need to be merely 
symbolic, as opposed to special, for two reasons.  First, the Government did not 
present any evidence of a specific drug problem among the State’s elected officials.97  
The Court conceded that a showing of a specific drug problem is not required in all 
cases, but such a showing “may help to clarify—and to substantiate—the precise 
hazards posed by [drug] use.”98  Second, the Court found that the State’s needs were 
                                                          
specifically address them, Vernonia and Earls have been placed in a subsequent section 
independent from the rest of the cases concerning other suspicionless drug-testing programs. 
88Id. at 309. 
89Id. at 313-14. 
90Id. 
91Id. at 317. 
92520 U.S. at 317. 
93489 U.S. 602. 
94489 U.S. 656. 
95515 U.S. 646.  As previously stated in note 87, Vernonia will be discussed under Section 
II, Subsection C, Part 2, which specifically addresses the Supreme Court’s treatment of public 
high school drug-testing programs.  This explains why Vernonia is mentioned during the 
discussion of Chandler without having first discussed Vernonia in full. 
96See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 317. 
97Id. at 321. 
98Id. at 319.  Compare Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646.  Chandler found that an “immediate crisis 
[was] prompted [in Vernonia] by a sharp rise in students’ use of unlawful drugs, [which] 
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not special because the subjected state officials were not performing “high-risk, 
safety-sensitive tasks, and the required certification immediately aid[ed] no 
interdiction effort.”99  Because the State of Georgia’s drug-testing program was 
merely symbolic and the public safety was not “genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth 
Amendment preclude[d] the suspicionless search.”100 
2.  Suspicionless drug-testing programs in public high schools 
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory drug-testing program for all 
middle school and high school student athletes, which was imposed without any 
individualized suspicion of drug use by any particular student(s).101  The Court first 
stated that a search conducted by school officials does not require either a warrant or 
probable cause when the government can show “special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement,”102 that would render the probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.  Once this threshold question is answered, schools are permitted to 
implement a search based on less than probable cause.  However, in order for 
schools to be permitted to impose a search without any requirement of individualized 
suspicion, courts must balance the competing interests of the school officials and the 
students based on three factors.  First, courts must review the strength of the privacy 
interest upon which the search intrudes.103  Second, the intrusive character of the 
search must be determined.104  Third, courts must consider the nature and immediacy 
of the government’s concerns that led to the imposition of a suspicionless drug-
testing program, along with the effectiveness of the imposed means for addressing 
these concerns.105   
In this case, the Court found that special needs that make the probable cause 
requirement impracticable exist in the public school context.106  This is because the 
probable cause requirement would “‘unduly interfere with the maintenance of the 
swift and informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed,’” and because of the 
“‘substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the 
schools.’”107  After satisfying this threshold inquiry, the Court applied the relevant 
factors of the balancing test.  
                                                          
bolstered the government’s and school official’s arguments that drug-testing programs were 
warranted and appropriate.” 
99520 U.S. at 321-22.  Compare Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (dealing with railway employees 
involved with the high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks incumbent upon railroad safety); Von Raab, 
489 U.S. 656 (dealing with U.S. Customs Service employees directly involved with drug 
interdiction efforts, and those required to carry firearms). 
100Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323. 
101515 U.S. 646, 664-65. 
102Id. at 653.  (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 
103Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654. 
104Id. at 658. 
105Id. at 660. 
106Id. at 653. 
107Id. at 653 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 341) (brackets in original). 
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In addressing the first factor, the Court found that schoolchildren have a 
diminished expectation of privacy because they are placed under the school’s 
authority, the nature of which is “custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of 
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”108  Even though 
students have a diminished expectation of privacy in general, student athletes in 
particular have an even lower expectation of privacy because they voluntarily submit 
to a degree of control greater than what is imposed on other students.109  Athletes 
submit to such a degree of regulation because they are required to undergo preseason 
physical examinations, either obtain health insurance coverage or sign an insurance 
waiver, maintain a minimum grade point average, and comply with other rules 
imposed by the team coaches and the school’s athletic director.110  Further, athletes 
engage in communal undress and showering.111 
In addressing the second factor, the Court found the invasive nature of the drug-
testing program to be negligible.112  The Court first noted, “the degree of intrusion 
depends upon the manner in which production of the urine sample is monitored.”113  
In this case, the conditions in which the urine samples were furnished were “nearly 
identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms.”114  Further, the Court 
addressed the invasiveness according to the manner in which the information 
obtained from the search was used.  This was not excessively invasive because the 
information was used solely to detect illicit drug use in order to screen students from 
participation in athletics.115  Additionally, the information was furnished only to a 
limited class of school officials on a need-to-know basis, and the information was 
not passed on to law enforcement personnel for law enforcement purposes.116 
Third, the Court addressed the nature and immediacy of the government’s 
concerns and the effectiveness of the search at reaching them.117  The nature of the 
government’s concerns—combating drug use by schoolchildren—was important 
because of the adverse effects that drugs have on the physical and psychological 
maturation processes, and because such effects pose an immediate threat of physical 
harm to athletes that are under the stress of physical competition.118  Regarding the 
immediacy of the government’s concerns, the Court found the need to combat drug 
                                                                
108Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. 
109Id. at 656-67.     
110Id. at 657. 
111Id. 
112Id. at 658. 
113515 U.S. at 658. 
114Id.  Male students furnished their samples by urinating into a cup while standing at a 
urinal, and female students furnished their samples by urinating into a cup while in individual 
stalls.  Id. 
115Id. 
116515 U.S. at 658. 
117Id. at 660. 
118Id. at 661-62. 
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use in this particular school district was great because the school was in a “state of 
rebellion . . . fueled by alcohol and drug abuse,” and the athletes served as the role 
models for this rebellious subculture.119  Regarding the program’s efficacy, focusing 
the search on the leaders of the rebellious subculture, who were also subjected to the 
more immediate threat of physical harm, effectively addressed the school’s 
concerns.120  Because the balancing test favored the school’s interests in 
implementing a suspicionless drug-testing program over the students’ privacy 
interests, the Supreme Court upheld the program as “reasonable and hence 
constitutional.”121 
Almost seven years later, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of 
another suspicionless drug-testing program implemented by a public high school.  In 
Earls,122 the Court applied the factors established in Vernonia.123  Consequently, the 
Court upheld the suspicionless drug-testing program imposed on all high school 
students participating in competitive extra-curricular activities, such as band and 
choir.124   
As a threshold matter, the Court considered whether the school had special needs 
that made the probable cause requirement impracticable, which would justify the 
imposition of a search based on less than probable cause.125  The Court stated that 
schools have special needs to dispense with the probable cause requirement because 
of the impracticality of requiring such a stringent standard in the school setting.126  
The Court relied primarily on precedent by stating, “this Court has previously held 
that ‘special needs’ inhere in the public school context.”127  For further support, the 
Court stated that a Fourth Amendment inquiry “cannot disregard the schools’ 
custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”128  Subsequently, the Court applied 
the relevant factors of the balancing test.   
The first consideration was the nature of the students’ privacy interests 
implicated by the search.129  The Court found that students enjoy a diminished 
expectation of privacy in the public school context, “where the State is responsible 
for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.”130  In general, schoolchildren have a 
lowered expectation of privacy, but those who compete in competitive extra-
curricular activities voluntarily submit to even greater control than what the rest of 
                                                                
119515 U.S at 662-63. 
120Id. 
121Id. at 664-65. 
122Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
123Id. at 830; see also Veronia, 515 U.S. 646. 
124Earls, 536 U.S. at 838. 
125Id. at 829. 
126Id. at 828-29.   
127Id. at 829 (quoting T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 339-40; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653). 
128Id. at 829-30 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656). 
129Earls, 536 U.S. at 830. 
130Id. (referencing Vernonia, 536 U.S. at 656). 
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the student body is subjected to.131  Therefore, the students enjoyed a limited 
expectation of privacy.132  
The Court next addressed the character of the intrusion of the search.133  The 
Court began by stating that the “‘degree of intrusion’ on one’s privacy caused by 
collecting a urine sample ‘depends upon the manner in which production of the urine 
sample is monitored.’”134  In considering the manner of production of the urine 
sample, the character of the intrusion in this case was minimal because the urinalysis 
test was not physically invasive and was furnished in the privacy of a restroom.135  
Additionally, the Court addressed the minimally invasive manner in which the 
information yielded from the search was used.  The results obtained from the drug 
tests were “kept in confidential files separate from a student’s other educational 
records and released to school personnel only on a ‘need to know’ basis.”136  Further, 
the information was used solely for detecting illicit drug use, and was “not turned 
over to law enforcement [personnel].”137   
Third, the Court addressed “the nature and immediacy of the government’s 
concerns.”138  In finding the nature of the school’s concerns to be pressing and 
important, the Court began by stating that it “has already articulated in detail the 
importance of the governmental concern in preventing drug use by 
schoolchildren.”139  However, the importance of the government’s concern in 
preventing drug use by schoolchildren was found by the Court to be the same, if not 
greater, in this case because “the drug abuse problem . . . has hardly abated since 
Vernonia was decided in 1995.140  In fact, evidence suggests that it has only grown 
worse.”141  Additionally, the “health and safety risks identified in Vernonia142 apply 
                                                                
131Id. at 831-32.  “[S]tudents who participate in competitive extracurricular activities 
voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes    
. . . All of them have their own rules and requirements for participating students that do not 
apply to the student body as a whole.”  Id. 
132Id. at 832. 
133Id. 
134Earls, 536 U.S. at 832 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658). 
135Id. at 833.  The Court found the test as conducted in this case was “even less 
problematic” than the test in Vernonia because, with everything else being equal, the male 
students in this case were allowed to furnish their samples in the privacy of individual stalls, 
whereas the male students in Vernonia were required to furnish their samples while standing at 
urinals. 
136Id.   
137Id. at 833. 
138Id. at 834. 
139Id. (referencing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-62). 
140Earls was decided in 2002, seven years after Vernonia. 
141Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.  “The number of 12th graders using any illicit drug increased 
from 48.4 percent in 1995 to 53.9 percent in 2001.  The number of 12th graders reporting that 
they had used marijuana jumped from 41.7 percent to 49.0 percent during that same period” 
(referencing DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL 
RESULTS ON ADOLESCENT DRUG USE, OVERVIEW KEY FINDINGS (2001) (Table 1)). 
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with equal force to Tecumseh’s143 schoolchildren.”144  Therefore, “the nationwide 
drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.”145  
The School District had also presented “specific evidence of drug use at Tecumseh 
schools.”146   
Regarding the immediacy of the government’s concerns, the Court found the 
necessary immediacy in the “need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of 
childhood drug use.”147  Further, the evidence of increased drug use in the school 
district compounded the immediacy of the government’s concerns in combating drug 
use by its students.148   
Finally, the Court was satisfied that the school’s drug-testing program was 
effective at meeting the school’s concerns.149  The Court conceded that, in Vernonia, 
there “might have been a closer fit between the testing of athletes and the trial court’s 
finding that the drug problem was ‘fueled by the “role model” effect of athletes’ drug 
use.’”150  However, the Court stated that this finding was not essential to the holding 
in Vernonia, and that schools are not required to test the group[s] of students most 
likely to use drugs.151  Instead, the Vernonia test considers a program’s 
constitutionality according to the school’s custodial responsibilities over its 
students.152  In reviewing the drug-testing program in this case according to the 
School District’s custodial responsibilities, the Court found that “the drug testing of 
Tecumseh students who participate in extracurricular activities effectively serves the 
                                                          
142515 U.S. at 661-62.  These risks concern the inhibiting effects on an adolescent’s 
healthy psycho-social development and maturation processes. 
143The Tecumseh School District is the one that implemented the drug-testing program 
under scrutiny in Earls. 
144Earls, 536 U.S. at 834. 
145Id. 
146Id.  “Teachers testified that they had seen students who appeared to be under the 
influence of drugs and that they had heard students speaking openly about using drugs.  A 
drug dog found marijuana cigarettes near the school parking lot.  Police officers once found 
drugs or drug paraphernalia in a car driven by a Future Farmers of America member.  And the 
school board president reported that people in the community were calling the board to discuss 
the ‘drug situation.’”  Id. at 834-35. 
147Id. at 836.   
148Id.  Respondents argued that there was not an immediate drug epidemic facing the 
school district, as was found in Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662-63.  However, in Earls, the Court 
stated that “it would make little sense to require a school district to wait for a substantial 
portion of its students to begin using drugs before it was allowed to institute a drug testing 
program,” and that the Court “refuse[d] to fashion what would in effect be a constitutional 
quantum of drug use necessary to show a ‘drug problem.’” 
149Earls, 536 U.S. at 837. 
150Id. at 837-38 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663). 
151Id. at 838. 
152Id. 
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School District’s interest in protecting the safety and health of its students.”153  
Ultimately, the Court found that the school’s interests in implementing the 
suspicionless drug-testing program outweighed the students’ privacy expectations, 
and held that the school’s “policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School 
District’s important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its 
schoolchildren.”154   
Even though the Supreme Court established this balancing test to determine the 
constitutionality of high school drug-testing programs, some ambiguities remain.  
The Court has applied the test only to programs involving competitive extra-
curricular activities, athletic and otherwise; therefore, it is unclear whether drug-
testing programs imposed in other contexts will be upheld.  In response to this 
ambiguity, the next section will apply the factors of the Court’s balancing test to the 
program imposed by Groveport Madison High School.   
III.  VERNONIA FACTORS APPLIED 
The Groveport Madison drug-testing program is subject to scrutiny under the test 
established by the Supreme Court in Vernonia.  This section will apply the requisite 
factors of the test to the Groveport Madison drug-testing program.155  As will be 
seen, after a strict application of the balancing test, the Groveport Madison program 
is likely to be found constitutional.  It will be argued later, however, that public 
policy considerations weigh the balance against expanding drug-testing programs to 
contexts beyond those already addressed by the Supreme Court, including programs 
imposed on students applying for on-campus parking privileges. 
A.  Special Needs  
Before application of the balancing test, the threshold inquiry of whether the 
circumstances require either a search warrant or probable cause, or whether special 
needs exist that would render the warrant and probable cause requirements 
impracticable, must be satisfied.156  The Supreme Court has held that such special 
needs do exist in the public school context because the requirement that a search be 
based on probable cause would unduly interfere with the need to maintain order and 
to exact swift discipline.157  Because Groveport Madison is a public school in Ohio, 
courts are highly likely to find that the school has special needs that would justify 
imposition of a search based on less than probable cause.  Subsequent to satisfaction 
of this inquiry, the balancing test must weigh in favor of the school in order for its 
suspicionless drug-testing program to be upheld. 
                                                                
153Id. at 837.  The Court failed to offer any substantive analytical or evidentiary support 
for this finding without any explanation or reasoning for this failure.   
154Id. at 838. 
155The application of the factors in this section may not be exactly the same as applied by 
a court in formal litigation proceedings because of this author’s lack of access to exhaustive 
facts.  Therefore, this application is primarily speculative and is based on the Court’s dicta and 
holdings in Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646 and Earls, 536 U.S. 822. 
156See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; Earls, 536 U.S. at 828. 
157T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654; Earls, 536 U.S. at 828-30. 
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B.  The Privacy Interests Implicated by the Search 
After the threshold inquiry has been satisfied, the first factor in the balancing test 
considers the nature of the privacy interests implicated by the search.158  The 
Supreme Court has previously stated that students possess a lower expectation of 
privacy than the rest of society, at least while under a school’s authority.159  This is 
due to the “custodial and tutelary” functions that schools exercise over their 
students.160  Further, the Court has recognized circumstances where, through 
participation in certain organizations, some students voluntarily diminish their 
expectations of privacy even further.161 
In the Groveport Madison case, the subjects of the drug-testing programs are 
public high school students.  Because of the custodial and tutelary functions that the 
school exercises over the students, their expectations of privacy are highly likely to 
be perceived as diminished.  Further, the drug-testing program in question is 
imposed as a condition on obtaining an on-campus parking permit.  The Supreme 
Court has previously held that owners/operators of automobiles enjoy a lesser degree 
of privacy expectations than the rest of society.162  Therefore, the students subject to 
the Groveport Madison drug-testing program have likely volunteered to decrease 
their already diminished expectations of privacy simply by applying for an on-
campus parking permit.   
C.  The Invasiveness of the Drug-Testing Program 
The second factor in the balancing test commands a consideration of how 
invasive the drug-testing program is into the privacy of the subjects.163  The 
Groveport Madison drug-testing program is conducted via urinalysis.  In both 
Vernonia and Earls, the drug-testing programs in question were also conducted via 
urinalysis.  In each of these cases, the Supreme Court found that the programs were 
                                                                
158Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654; Earls, 536 U.S. at 830. 
159Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655; Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-32. 
160Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655; Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-32. 
161Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656-57 (student athletes voluntarily submit to physical 
examinations, are required either to obtain health insurance coverage or to sign an insurance 
waiver, maintain a minimum grade point average, abide by other team and school rules, and 
also engage in communal undress and showering); Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-32 (students 
participating in competitive extra-curricular activities voluntarily submit to rules and 
regulations that are particularized to their group(s) and not imposed on the student body as a 
whole). 
162See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (“[O]ne’s expectation 
of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the 
traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”) (upholding the 
government’s practice of stopping and questioning motorists at reasonably located checkpoints 
on the borders absent any individualized suspicion); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) 
(holding that privacy interests in automobiles are diminished for two reasons: first, vehicles 
are readily movable, which makes a warrant impracticable because the vehicle could flee the 
location before a warrant is obtained; second, there are strict governmental regulations on 
vehicle ownership and use). 
163Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832. 
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not invasive because of the conditions in which the urine samples were furnished, 
and because of the limited purpose for which the information was used.164 
This factor may be more questionable in the Groveport Madison case than in the 
others, but it is still likely to be satisfied.  For example, the urine samples are likely 
furnished under conditions similar to those in the cases that have already met the 
Supreme Court’s approval because, presumably, they are provided in school 
restrooms.165 Arguably, however, the company used by Groveport Madison to 
conduct the urinalysis tests may have undermined the minimally intrusive character 
of the program.  The company allegedly allowed a male employee to monitor the 
girls’ samples by positioning him so that he could see into the girls’ restroom and 
observe the stalls.166  On the other hand, the courts will likely dismiss this as one 
instance of an error in judgment, which likely will not jeopardize the program in its 
entirety.167   
The Groveport Madison program is also likely to be viewed as minimally 
intrusive because the information obtained by the tests is used for limited purposes.  
One purpose for which the information is used is to prevent students from driving 
while under the influence of illicit drugs and/or alcohol.168  Another purpose is to 
help wayward youth by diverting students that test positive into counseling.169  
However, arguably, these purposes may be pre-textual.  The Groveport Madison 
Principal has been quoted as saying, “we have some kids who have problems.  
Parents want to know if their kids are using or not.”170  Informing parents of their 
children’s drug activity may not be a legitimate purpose for imposing a drug-testing 
program because it appears merely to be an attempt at side-stepping the constraints 
                                                                
164Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832-33.  In both cases, the urine samples 
were furnished in restrooms, and the information was used solely to detect alcohol and/or 
illicit drug use to determine candidacy for the respective activities; further, the information 
was not turned over to law enforcement authorities. 
165This author states that the samples are “presumably” furnished in school restrooms, 
similar to the situations in Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646 and Earls, 536 U.S. 822, because one 
newspaper article hints that the urine samples were furnished in restrooms exclusive to each 
gender.  Bush, supra note 7 (“the testing firm had a man in the women’s restroom while girls 
were urinating into cups in the stalls”). 
166Id; Harden, Parking Policy, supra note 7.  The Groveport Madison Principal countered 
this allegation by showing Columbus Dispatch journalist Mike Harden where the monitors’ 
table was situated, which was reportedly in a position where the monitor could possibly 
observe some of the stalls. 
167See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833 (when addressing the allegation that the Choir teacher had 
inadvertently left a list of one student’s current prescription drugs in a position where other 
students were able to discover the information, the Supreme Court stated, “this one example of 
alleged carelessness hardly increases the character of the intrusion”). 
168Bush, supra note 7 (referring to school officials as saying, “the measure is to discourage 
students from driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol”). 
169Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7 (quoting principal Mike Beck as saying, “I want 
to help kids, and we have some kids who have problems . . . [t]he idea is not disciplining them, 
but educating them.  If they’re impaired, we’re trying to get them into a treatment program”). 
170
 Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7. 
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imposed on state officials’ policing powers.  Despite this, the program will likely be 
viewed as minimally intrusive into the students’ expectations of privacy because it is 
conducted under conditions that the Supreme Court has already viewed as similar to 
those in which the bodily function is ordinarily performed. 
D.  The Nature and Immediacy of the School’s Concerns 
The next factor in the Supreme Court’s balancing test considers the nature and 
immediacy of the school’s concerns that initially led to the imposition of a drug-
testing program.171  In each of the previous cases, the Supreme Court found that the 
nature of the government’s concerns was important, and that the immediacy of the 
concerns was great.172  The Groveport Madison program is likely to receive similar 
treatment. 
The nature of the Groveport Madison School District’s concerns will most likely 
be seen as important because the adverse health and safety risks that drugs have on 
schoolchildren, both physically and psychologically, remain just as dangerous as 
they were in the previous cases.  Additionally, the Court in Vernonia highlighted the 
fact that the nature of the school district’s concerns were increased because the focal 
points, student athletes, were threatened with an even greater risk of immediate 
physical harm due to the high stress of physical competition.173  In Groveport 
Madison, the focal point is on student drivers, who are likely to be seen as facing a 
greater risk of immediate physical harm from drug use because students who drive 
under the influence are inflicted with impaired driving abilities, which increases the 
risk of automobile accidents.  Finally, in Earls, the Court placed some emphasis on 
the fact that the “nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing 
concern in every school.” 174  Because the war against drugs has not abated much, if 
at all, since the Court made this statement, the government's concern is likely to be 
seen as just as pressing in the Groveport Madison case.   
Based on precedent, it is unclear whether the immediacy of the concerns of the 
Groveport Madison School District will also be seen as great.  When addressing this 
prong of the balancing test, the Court in Vernonia only discussed the fact that the 
school district was in a “‘state of rebellion . . . fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as 
well as by the student’s [sic] misperceptions about the drug culture.’”175  Although 
the Court did not discuss any other evidentiary facts in addressing the immediacy of 
                                                                
171Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660; Earls, 536 U.S. at 834. 
172Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-63 (the nature of the concerns was important because of the 
adverse effects that drugs have on the development processes, compounded with the threat of 
physical harm to athletes; the immediacy was great because the school district was 
experiencing an increase in drug use, which was fueled by student athletes); Earls, 536 U.S. at 
834-36 (the nature of the concerns was important because of the nationwide epidemic of drug 
use, and because of  the health and safety risks that face schoolchildren who abuse drugs; the 
need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug use, as well as the increased 
drug use in the particular school district, provided the necessary immediacy). 
173Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662. 
174Earls, 536 U.S. at 834. 
175Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 1354, 
1357 (D. Or. 1992)). 
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the school’s concerns, the Court in Earls stated that this “finding was not essential to 
the holding,” and also stated that the Court “did not require the school to test the 
group of students most likely to use drugs, but rather considered the constitutionality 
of the program in the context of the public school’s custodial responsibilities.”176  
Although the Court in Earls interpreted this factor to only require a consideration of 
the school’s custodial responsibilities over its students, the opinion in Vernonia does 
not state this proposition at all.  Therefore, it is unclear whether the opinions are 
inconsistent and unclear as to which interpretation future cases should rely upon.  If 
the Vernonia interpretation177 is applied, then it is unclear whether this factor is 
satisfied because this author has no facts indicating that the Groveport Madison 
School District is experiencing an increase in drug use or is under threat of a drug 
epidemic.  Alternatively, if the Earls interpretation178 is applied, then the school’s 
concerns will likely be seen as immediate because of the custodial responsibilities 
that the school exercises over its students. 
E.  The Efficacy of the Drug-Testing Program 
The final factor in the balancing test is to consider the effectiveness of the 
imposed drug-testing program at achieving the government’s concerns.179  In 
Vernonia, the Court found the program to be effective at meeting the school’s 
concerns because it was narrowly focused on student athletes, who were the leaders 
of the rebellious subculture and who were also subjected to a more immediate threat 
of physical harm.180  In Earls, the Court found that the drug-testing program 
effectively addressed the school’s concerns “in protecting the safety and health of its 
students.”181  
Based on precedent, the Groveport Madison program is likely to be viewed as 
effective at addressing the school’s concerns.  Although the Vernonia analysis 
appeared to have relied on the fact that the program was narrowly focused on student 
athletes, the Earls analysis182 stated that this factor, like the former, is to be 
considered according to the school’s custodial responsibilities over its students.  If 
the Earls analysis is relied upon, the effectiveness of the Groveport Madison case 
will likely be found simply because the school is exercising its custodial 
responsibilities over the students.  The Groveport Madison school officials imposed 
this drug-testing program in order to prevent students from driving while under the 
influence of illicit drugs and also to divert wayward youth into counseling.183  This 
                                                                
176Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38.   
177This interpretation appears to rely upon a showing that the particular school district 
involved is under a threat of student rebellion fueled by alcohol and/or drug use. 
178Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38.  This interpretation requires only that the constitutionality of 
the program be determined by considering the context of the school’s custodial responsibilities 
over its students. 
179Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660; Earls, 536 U.S. at 837. 
180Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663. 
181Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38. 
182Id. at 838. 
183Bush, supra note 7; Harden, Drug-Test Rule, supra note 7. 
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will likely lead to the conclusion that the school is “protecting the safety and health 
of its students,”184 which would lead to the conclusion that the program is effective at 
achieving the school’s concerns. 
IV.  PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
This section discusses several public policy considerations that ought to be 
addressed when applying the pertinent factors in the Supreme Court’s balancing test.  
Arguably, these public policy considerations weigh the balance in favor of limiting 
public school drug-testing programs to the contexts already considered by the Court, 
and inhibit expanding such programs to other contexts, such as the program imposed 
by Groveport Madison.   
A.  Special Needs 
The threshold inquiry that must be satisfied before applying the balancing test is 
whether schools can show special needs to impose a search without securing a 
judicial warrant or possessing probable cause.185  The Supreme Court has found that 
schools satisfy this inquiry because of their custodial and tutelary responsibility over 
the students, and because strict adherence to these requirements would unduly 
interfere with the substantial need for schools to maintain order.186  However, one 
public policy concern counteracts these justifications.   
Despite the substantial need for schools to maintain order while exercising their 
custodial and tutelary responsibilities over students, the Supreme Court has held that 
schools, acting as state agents, must respect students’ constitutional rights.187  For 
example, in Tinker, the Court stated that “state-operated schools may not be enclaves 
of totalitarianism,” and that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over 
their students.”188  Further, when the Court found that schoolchildren retain a 
legitimate expectation of privacy, it declared that it was not ready to hold that “the 
schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”189   
Because schools ought to respect students’ legitimate expectations of privacy, 
they should not be able to dispense with the constraints ordinarily imposed on state 
agents—such as requiring a warrant, probable cause, or some kind of particularized 
suspicion—simply because they have decided to impose a drug-testing program on 
its students.  Instead, the school whose drug-testing program is in question should be 
obligated to show that it had been experiencing some kind of epidemic with drug 
abuse or student rebellion before it implemented the program.  This would provide 
the school with the requisite special needs to dispense with the warrant and probable 
                                                                
184Earls, 536 U.S. at 838. 
185T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652; Earls, 536 U.S. at 828. 
186Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; Earls, 536 U.S. at 830. 
187See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41. 
188393 U.S. at 511. 
189T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338-39.  The Court was referring to Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651 (1977), wherein it held that the need to maintain order in prisons leads to inmates 
enjoying no legitimate expectation of privacy.  The Court stated that this need for order is not 
parallel in the school systems to the extent that students should not be given a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.     
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cause requirements because its custodial responsibilities and maintenance of order 
would be threatened, and the school would be forced to impose the drug-testing 
program as a means of rebuilding order and integrity in its school district. 
B.  The Nature of the Privacy Interests Implicated 
After satisfaction of the threshold inquiry, the first factor in the Supreme Court’s 
balancing test is the nature of the individual privacy interests implicated by the drug-
testing program.190  In addressing this factor, the Court has stated that students in 
general have a diminished expectation of privacy because of the custodial and 
tutelary functions that schools have over students.191  Additionally, students involved 
in competitive extra-curricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to an even 
greater degree of control than other students, which erodes their privacy interests 
even further.192  However, two public policy considerations support the students’ 
privacy interests.   
The first public policy consideration concerns one of the primary objectives of 
our nation’s schools.  Schoolchildren are at such a tender age that they may be 
ignorant as to what constitutional rights are afforded to our nation’s citizens.  
Additionally, they may be ignorant as to the functioning of our government, and 
especially ignorant as to the interaction of the government with its citizenry.  
Because of this, the Supreme Court has found that one of the most important 
functions of schools is to prepare students for citizenship, and, therefore, should not 
teach students to “discount important principles of our government [including 
constitutional rights] as mere platitudes.”193  This suggests that students have to be 
taught to recognize and respect our government’s important principles, including 
constitutional rights.  One such important principle of our government is that the 
citizenry retains a right to privacy, which includes the right to be protected from 
unreasonable governmental interference.194  However, when schools impose 
suspicionless drug-testing programs based on general concerns about drug use—
instead of in response to an actual epidemic or problem with drug use in its particular 
school district—students learn that their constitutional rights are flexible under the 
weight of governmental pressure, and their privacy should be stripped away 
whenever the government expresses some abstract, generalized concern.195  Further, 
the students are learning that, in the eyes of authority, they are guilty until proven 
innocent, even in the absence of any particularized suspicion.196   
                                                                
190Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654; Earls, 536 U.S. at 830. 
191See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-57; Earls 536 U.S. at 830-32. 
192See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-57; Earls 536 U.S. at 830-32. 
193Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). 
194See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (“Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied 
in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states, and that the right to be secure 
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can 
no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise . . . . Our decision, founded on reason 
and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him . . 
.”).   
195See GUNJA et al., supra note 2, at 17. 
196Id. 
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Instead, students should be taught that their rights are inalienable, and that, as 
citizens, their privacy interests should not be swept aside at the government’s 
pleasure.  In order for students to understand and respect their right to privacy as 
against the government, they must have their right respected by the authority figures 
that are in a position to strip the right away.  If school officials deprive students of 
their right to privacy by imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program based on 
abstract, generalized concerns, the students will not be taught how important this 
right is, and will most likely discount it as a “mere platitude.”197   
Of equal importance, students should learn to understand and respect the 
important governmental principle that one who is accused of wrongdoing is afforded 
a presumption of innocence.198  The accusing party must rebut this presumption of 
innocence before the accused can be deemed responsible for any wrongdoing, rather 
than the accused having to bear the burden of establishing his/her innocence.199  If 
students are not granted this presumption of innocence, then its importance will be 
lost, and the students will most likely discount it as a “mere platitude.”200 
The second public policy consideration under this factor is that students’ privacy 
interests should be respected so that the relationships between the students and their 
mentors are not tarnished.  When teachers and coaches serve as mentors, students 
begin to trust and confide in them.  These relationships are vital to the students’ 
learning environment and maturation processes.  These relationships provide the 
students with role models that may help them follow a healthy path of maturation 
and psycho-social development, as well as fostering a more positive and productive 
learning environment.201  However, when these officials are compelling students to 
choose between either exposing their privacy or forfeiting a particular benefit or 
privilege, the relationship is damaged.202  Consequently, the students might harbor 
negative attitudes toward school in general, and to the school official in particular, 
thereby jeopardizing the student’s educational and developmental processes.  
Accordingly, Drs. Gunja, Cox, Rosenbaum, and Appel argue, “drug testing can 
undermine student-teacher relationships by pitting students against the teachers and 
                                                                
197T.L.O., 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). 
198See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (“The presumption of innocence, a 
thought not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our 
system of criminal justice.”). 
199See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (A presumption of innocence is “[t]he 
fundamental principle that a person may not be convicted of a crime unless the government 
proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without any burden placed on the accused to prove 
innocence.”).   
200Id. 
201See GUNJA et al., supra note 2, at 8.  This publication notes that “student-teacher trust 
helps create an atmosphere in which students can address their fears and concerns, both about 
drug use itself and the issues in their lives that can lead to drug use, including depression, 
anxiety, peer pressure, and unstable family lives.” 
202Id.  “Trust is jeopardized if teachers act as confidants in some circumstances but as 
police in others.” 
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coaches who test them, [thereby] eroding trust, and leaving students feeling ashamed 
and resentful.” 203 
C.  Invasiveness 
The second factor in the Supreme Court’s balancing test is to consider how 
invasive the search is.204  In Vernonia and Earls, the Court found the drug-testing 
programs were not excessively invasive because of the manner in which production 
of the urine samples were monitored, and because of the limited purpose for which 
the information obtained from the drug tests was used.205  In considering the manner 
in which production of the urine samples were monitored, the Court stated that the 
nature of the urinalysis process was not very different from the normal process of 
urination.206  In both cases, the urine samples were furnished in the privacy of 
restrooms, with the girls in stalls, and the boys in either a stall or standing at a 
urinal.207   
However, the Court did not address the fact that the students furnishing urine 
samples were being observed by adult monitors, whose job was to ensure that the 
urine samples were not tampered with in any way, which is abnormal to the urination 
process and may produce anxiety and embarrassment on behalf of the students.208  
Adding insult to injury, the Groveport Madison case involved a male monitor 
overseeing the girls’ samples by positioning himself so that he could see into the 
girls’ restroom.209  Needless to say, this is not normal to the ordinary function and 
also produced some discomfort and embarrassment on behalf of the girls providing 
the urine samples.210  Further, the students urinate into plastic cups and the monitor 
then tests the urine for any abnormal characteristics, which also is not a part of the 
ordinary urinary function and may produce anxiety or embarrassment on behalf of 
the students.  Because these conditions are not part of the normal urination process, 
and may be the source of anxiety or embarrassment for students, courts should be 
more hesitant to find that a urinalysis sample is furnished in conditions similar to 
those in which the function is ordinarily performed.  Consequently, courts should 
                                                                
203Id. 
204Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832. 
205Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832-33 
206Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832-33. 
207Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Earls, 536 U.S. at 832-33.  In Vernonia, males provided 
their samples while standing at urinals, whereas females provided their samples while in 
individual stalls.  In Earls, however, males were allowed to provide their samples while in 
individual stalls as well, which the Court found to provide greater protection of privacy 
interests. 
208See Brief of Respondents at 3, Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (No. 01-332) (“One of the faculty 
monitors joked that the process seemed like an exercise in ‘potty training,’ which produced 
embarrassment on behalf of Respondent.”).  
209Bush, supra note 7; Harden, Parking Policy, supra note 7.   
210Columbus Dispatch reporter Bill Bush quoted student Shannon Partlow as saying, 
“there was a man sitting in our bathroom while we were trying to take our drug test, trying to 
do our business . . . that made me extremely uncomfortable.”  Bush, supra note 7. 
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recognize that such abnormal conditions heighten the invasiveness of drug-testing 
programs. 
Another condition of drug-testing programs that should be considered when 
analyzing their invasiveness, which also tends to weigh in favor of the students’ 
privacy interests, is how consent to the programs is obtained.  Schools obtain consent 
to drug-testing programs by requiring students to submit to, and pass, a drug-test in 
order to participate in some extracurricular activity, or to receive some other 
privilege not conferred on all students.  However, this consent may not be 
meaningful enough to be valid, which would increase the invasiveness of the drug-
testing programs on students’ privacy interests, possibly to the point where they are 
not justified in the balancing test.    
Participation in extracurricular activities is vital to students’ schooling.  They 
assist students in gaining acceptance into an institution of higher education and in 
obtaining jobs after graduation; they provide memorable experiences of the school 
years; they foster healthy peer relationships; and they teach important life, social, 
and vocational skills, such as teamwork, responsibility, dedication, and perseverance.  
For these reasons, students might seriously consider allowing their privacy to be 
violated just so they do not lose the privilege of participating in such important 
activities.  If a student succumbs to the required drug-testing program primarily for 
this reason, then one may argue that the consent is not meaningful and, therefore, is 
not valid. 
This argument can be extended to on-campus parking privileges as well.  For 
some students, their ability to drive to school may be their only means of 
transportation.  However, some of these students may not be able to drive to school 
at all if they are not able to park on campus, because of a possible inability to park in 
the area surrounding campus.  Consequently, students who must rely on their own, 
independent mode of transportation, such as students who live in rural areas, may not 
be able to secure a ride to and from school on a daily basis, or at least a ride that will 
get them to school on time regularly.  Further, the student’s parent(s) may not be able 
to provide transportation because of obligations with work and/or younger siblings.  
Therefore, a student who depends on being able to provide for his/her own 
transportation to and from school would be forced to consent to a drug test just so 
s/he does not have to face the undue hardship of having to find alternative 
transportation, if any is to be found at all.  Therefore, consent to the drug-testing 
program would not be meaningful and would therefore be invalid.  Consequently, the 
invasiveness of the drug-testing program for students applying for on-campus 
parking permits would be too great to justify. 
Additionally, some students who participate in extracurricular activities may also 
depend on being able to provide their own transportation during weekend and after 
school hours because of an inability to secure alternative transportation from other 
students or parents.  If these students are forced to give up their on-campus parking 
privileges, and, consequently, their ability to drive to and from school, then they 
would also be forced to forfeit participation in extracurricular activities.  By 
forfeiting participation in extracurricular activities, the students would be denied the 
benefits and skills normally obtained through such involvement, as previously 
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discussed.211  Therefore, the students would likely forfeit their privacy interests in 
order to maintain participation in such important extracurricular activities.  
Therefore, consent to the program will not be meaningful and will thus be invalid. 
High school students are at such a tender age that they are likely to take for 
granted their constitutional rights and the functioning of government, and, if forced 
to choose, are likely to favor participation in certain activities or receiving certain 
privileges over the preservation of constitutional rights.  As previously discussed, 
students may be ignorant as to what rights are afforded to them in particular, and 
what rights are afforded to our nation’s citizens in general.  For this reason, the 
Supreme Court has stated that one primary objective of our nation’s schools is to 
prepare students for citizenship, and that schools should not teach students to 
“discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”212  As 
previously discussed, this suggests that students have to be taught to respect 
governmental principles, including constitutional rights. Because students have to be 
taught to respect their constitutional rights, they are not likely to favor them over 
participation in extracurricular activities or receipt of parking privileges.  
Participation in extracurricular activities and receiving parking privileges cause 
immediate, empirical effects when they are either granted or denied, whereas 
dismissing a constitutional right is likely to have only abstract effects that are not 
easily recognized by individual students.  Consequently, when faced with having to 
choose between forfeiting an abstract constitutional right that the student may not 
even be fully educated about, or a privilege or benefit that is highly desired or 
important to the student, the student is likely to choose to dismiss the abstract 
constitutional right.  However, this may not qualify as an informed decision, and 
may not be meaningful consent to the drug-testing program.  Therefore, when 
considering the lack of meaningful consent, drug-testing programs may actually be 
much more invasive of students’ privacy interests than the Supreme Court had 
originally considered. 
D.  The Efficacy of Drug-Testing Programs 
The final factor213 considered in the Supreme Court’s balancing test is the 
efficacy (the effectiveness) of the imposed drug-testing program at achieving the 
government’s concerns.214  The Court has found that this factor weighs in favor of a 
drug-testing program when there is a factual showing of an increase in drug use by 
students in the particular school district under scrutiny, and/or by the particular group 
of students being tested.215   However, in Earls, the Court emphasized that schools 
                                                                
211Such benefits and skills include gaining acceptance into an institution of higher 
education, obtaining a job, creating memorable experiences, fostering healthy peer 
relationships, and instilling various important life, social, and vocational skills. 
212Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). 
213This author has not discussed the previous two factors of the Court’s balancing test—
the nature and immediacy of the government’s concerns—because of an inability to find any 
public policy considerations that counteract their force in the test. 
214Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660; Earls, 536 U.S. at 837. 
215Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663-64 (the school district was found to be in a state of rebellion 
led by student athletes, which made drug-testing the district’s athletes particularly effective at 
reaching the government’s concerns).  
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are not required to test the particular group(s) of students most likely to use drugs, 
but, instead, “[the] constitutionality of the program [should be considered] in the 
context of the public school’s custodial responsibilities.”216  Therefore, it is not 
completely clear whether this factor requires a finding that the school district, or the 
particular group being tested, is experiencing an increase in drug use.  However, 
numerous public policy considerations beg that not every drug-testing program be 
considered effective at meeting the government’s concerns, regardless of whether the 
program targets an at-risk group. 
One public policy consideration in this area concerns the funds used to 
implement and sustain the programs.  This consideration argues that schools are 
wasting much-needed resources in implementing and sustaining drug-testing 
programs, because empirical studies have shown that they are not effective at 
deterring drug use.  In conducting one of the first empirical studies that analyzed the 
effectiveness of drug-testing programs at combating student drug use, Drs. Johnston, 
O’Malley, and Yamaguchi found no significant differences in marijuana or other 
illicit drug use by students in schools that implemented any kind of drug-testing 
program.217 Another study surveyed student athletes’ attitudes and behavior 
regarding drug use and found that health concerns were the most common reason for 
abstention.218  Most notably, this study found that detection of illicit drug use was not 
a concern of the students.219  Because of the overall ineffectiveness of drug-testing 
programs at deterring drug use, schools that implement such programs are wasting 
necessary resources that could be diverted to more beneficial uses.220  
                                                                
216Earls, 536 U.S. at 838. 
217ROYOKO YAMAGUCHI PHD, LLOYD D. JOHNSTON PHD, & PATRICK M. O’MALLEY PHD, 
DRUG TESTING IN SCHOOLS: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND ASSOCIATION WITH STUDENT DRUG USE 
(2003), at 15.  This study used cross-sectional data for a 12-month period to analyze the effect 
that drug-testing programs had on marijuana and other illicit drug use by middle school and 
high school students.  The study focused on schools that utilized a drug-testing program of any 
kind, a drug-testing program based on individual suspicion or cause, or a drug-testing program 
that focused solely on student athletes.  As stated above, there were no significant differences 
in marijuana or other illicit drug use by students attending the respective schools.  
Additionally, the study found no significant differences in drug use when comparing students 
labeled as heavy users against other students in the schools that implemented a program based 
on individualized suspicion or random drawing.  These findings were consistent for subjects 
containing controls as well as those without controls. 
218J. C. WALKER, The Substance Use Habits and the Perceptions of the Effectiveness of 
Drug Testing of Lynchburg City Schools’ High School Athletes, 53 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS 
INT’L 9-A (1993).   Other reasons included: a) not desiring the effects of drugs, b) not enjoying 
the use of illicit drugs, and c) not finding a need to use illicit drugs. 
219Id. 
220See GUNJA et al., supra note 2, at 9 (“Drug testing costs schools an average of $42 per 
student tested, which amounts to $21,000 for a high school that tests 500 students.  This figure 
is for the initial test alone and does not include the costs of other routine components of drug 
testing, such as additional tests throughout the year or follow-up testing for positive results.”); 
see also YAMAGUCHI et al., supra note 217, at 1 (“Testing for steroid use costs $100 per test, 
and a test that satisfies the National Collegiate Athletic Association standards for accuracy 
costs over $200 per test.”).   
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Another public policy consideration is that drug-testing programs deter students 
from engaging in extracurricular activities or seeking other privileges contingent 
upon passing a drug test out of fear of being tested.221 To corroborate this 
proposition, Drs. Gunja, Cox, Rosenbaum, and Appel pointed out that one school 
district under legal scrutiny for its drug-testing program “has seen a dramatic 
reduction in student participation in extracurricular activities since implementing 
drug testing.”222  One female student from the Tulia Independent School District223 
who was interviewed regarding the drug-testing program stated that she “know[s] 
lots of kids who don’t want to get into sports and stuff because they don’t want to get 
drug tested; [t]hat’s one of the reasons [she was] not into any [activity].”224  The 
deterrence of students from engaging in extracurricular activities is dangerous 
because studies have shown the benefits and positive correlations of participation in 
such activities.  For example, one study shows that students who participate in 
extracurricular activities are less likely to develop substance abuse problems; are less 
likely to engage in violent crime and other dangerous behavior; and are more likely 
to stay in school, achieve higher grades, and aim for, and receive, more ambitious 
educational goals.225  Therefore, students denied from participation in extracurricular 
activities due to their choice of respecting their privacy may experience some very 
harsh consequences that may negatively affect their future.  Consequently, drug-
testing programs may actually have a negative effect for students who choose to 
respect their right to privacy. 
Whatever merit these arguments have in weighing against drug-testing programs 
imposed as a condition on extracurricular activities, they may not have a similar 
effect when applied to the Groveport Madison program because it involves on-
campus parking privileges, which may not have any direct effect on the educational 
and maturation processes.  However, as previously discussed, some students denied 
from receiving on-campus parking privileges may not be able to participate in such 
extracurricular activities at all.  Some students denied on-campus parking privileges 
may not be able to drive to school if there are no alternative areas in which the 
students may park.  These students may not be able to rely on any alternative mode 
of transportation either, because they may live in areas that are too far to walk to a 
bus stop or are too far out of the way for a friend to provide a ride.  Further, the 
                                                                
221See GUNJA et al., supra note 2, at 12-13; J. Wald, Extracurricular Drug Testing, 21 
EDUCATION WEEK 34, 36 (2002). 
222GUNJA et al., supra note 2, at 13 (referring to Affidavit of Plaintiff Nancy Cozette Bean, 
p. 3, Bean v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2-01CV-0394J (D. Tex. Filed February 18, 2003) 
(“In 1990-1991 participation of black seniors was 100% in extracurricular clubs and activities 
and 100% in sports; while the 2000-2001 participation rates of black seniors fell to 0% within 
both [after implementation of a drug-testing program]”)). 
223The Tulia Independent School District was the one under scrutiny in Bean v. Tulia 
Independent School District, No. 2-01CV-0394J (D. Tex. Filed February 18, 2003), referred to 
in note 222. 
224Id.  The student expressed concern that she would always test positive and have to 
explain that she is on medication, which would embarrass her.  The student expressed 
additional concern over embarrassment should she be “on [her] period” at the time of testing. 
225Maureen Glancy, F.K. Willits & Patricia Farrel, Adolescent Activities and Adult Success 
and Happiness: Tweny-four Years Later, 242 SOCIOLOGY AND SOC. RES. 70.3 (1986). 
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students’ parent(s) may not be able to provide a ride to and from school because of 
obligations with work and/or younger siblings.  If these students are not able to 
obtain transportation to and from school on a regular basis, then, additionally, the 
students will likely be precluded from obtaining regular transportation to and from 
activity sites after school hours.  Therefore, some students denied on-campus parking 
privileges may be deterred from participating in the extracurricular activities that 
have a positive impact on the students’ educational and maturation processes.   
Another public policy consideration in this area is that students may abstain from 
using drugs that are known to be tested, or drugs that are easily detected, and simply 
switch to using harder drugs that are either more difficult to test or are not tested at 
all by the imposed program.226  For example, urinalysis tests are not very effective at 
detecting alcohol, amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, opiates, methamphetamines 
(a derivative of amphetamines), and methaqualone (Quaaludes) because they pass 
through the body within a few days.227  Urinalysis tests are also not very effective at 
detecting lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) because of its extreme sensitivity to heat 
above room temperature and direct exposure to light.228  Alternatively, marijuana and 
phencyclidine (PCP) both have a much more prolonged stay in the body, ranging 
from one day to several weeks.229  Consequently, marijuana and PCP are the drugs 
most easily detected by drug-testing programs, unless the subject(s) have used one of 
the other substances, excluding LSD, within the previous one to three days before 
providing a urine sample.  Therefore, students may simply refrain from abusing 
marijuana and PCP so as to avoid detection, and instead abuse the harder drugs that 
are not as easily detected. 
E.  Slippery Slope 
One final public policy consideration deals with the future of drug-testing 
programs as a whole, and is not restricted to any one factor in the Supreme Court’s 
balancing test.  Although this particular consideration does not apply to any of the 
factors in the test, it is an important concern that must be considered when discussing 
the impact of any constitutional issue.  The Supreme Court has already upheld two 
types of high school drug-testing programs, and the possibility is left open to uphold 
programs in other contexts as well.  If drug-testing programs continue to be upheld, 
eventually every student group is in danger of being subjected to a suspicionless 
drug-testing program.  Conceivably, schools may reach the point where they require 
every student in school to submit to a drug test, regardless of student group 
affiliation.   
                                                                
226See GUNJA et al., supra note 2, at 16 (“Because Marijuana is the most detectable drug, 
students may switch to drugs they think the test will not detect, like Ecstasy (MDMA) or 
inhalants.”). 
227RICHARD L. HAWKS, PHD, & C. Nora Chiang, PhD, Examples of Specific Drug Assays, 
Urine Testing for Drugs of Abuse, 73 NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE RES. MONOGRAPH SERIES 
84 (1986). 
228See HAWKS & CHIANG, supra note 227. 
229See id. 
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Since the early-to-mid-1990s, around the time that the Gun Free School Zones 
Act230 was signed into law, schools have begun to implement strict zero tolerance 
policies.231  Although zero tolerance policies were initially implemented to combat 
possession of weapons in schools, with the intended consequence of making schools 
safer, such policies have expanded to include other behavior viewed as disruptive or 
dangerous, such as drug and alcohol use.232  Such zero tolerance policies have led to 
students being subjected to interference by school officials for conduct that many 
would consider trivial.233  Some schools have even begun to require every student 
entering the school to pass through a metal detector in order to screen out those 
attempting to bring weapons into the school.234  If the trend of schools imposing 
suspicionless drug-testing programs on students is not halted at some point, then 
schools may see them as a routine attempt at maintaining order and discipline.  
Consequently, schools may begin to impose them on any and all groups of students, 
including non-competitive extracurricular activities such as multi-cultural club or 
peer mentor programs, with the eventual step of imposing suspicionless drug tests on 
every student in attendance at the school, much like subjecting every student entering 
the school to a metal detector search. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Public schools have begun to implement drug-testing programs that students are 
required to pass before they are allowed to participate in certain extracurricular 
activities or receive some other privileges.  The schools receive consent to the drug-
testing programs because participation in the activities and receipt of the privileges is 
voluntary and is contingent upon passing the test.  One controversial example of 
such a drug-testing program has been implemented by Groveport Madison High 
School in Groveport, Ohio.  This program requires students to pass a drug test in 
order to receive, and subsequently maintain, on-campus parking privileges.   
                                                                
23020 U.S.C. § 8921. 
231
 A zero tolerance policy is “a policy that mandates predetermined consequences or 
punishments for specified offenses.”  Brief of Amici Curiae, Earls, 536 U.S. 822, at 27, 
Footnote 17 (referencing National Center for Education Statistics report, Violence & 
Discipline Problems in U.S. Public Schools: 1996-1997). 
232See Brief of Amici Curiae, Earls, 536 U.S. 822, at 27.   
233Id.  This Brief refers to several “absurd consequences of this one-size-fits-all 
mentality.”  For example, a seventh grader in West Virginia was suspended for three days for 
giving a cough drop to a classmate because the cough drop was not approved by the school; a 
six-year-old was suspended for one day in North Carolina for kissing a female classmate, after 
being asked by the recipient of the kiss to do so, because the school deemed this conduct to be 
unwarranted and unwelcome touching; and a Louisiana second-grader was suspended and 
ordered to attend an alternative school for a month because the watch that he brought to school 
for show and tell had a one-inch-long pocketknife attached to it. 
234See Robert S. Johnson, COUNTERPOINT: Metal Detector Searches: An Effective 
Means to Help Keep Weapons out of Schools, 29 J. L. & EDUC. 197 (2000).  This Law Journal 
Note refers to the U.S. Departments on Education and Justice, Annual Report on School 
Safety 4 (Oct. 1998) when stating that four percent of schools report using random metal 
detector searches on students, and one percent report daily use of metal detector searches. 
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In order to determine the legality of high school drug-testing programs, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has established a balancing test to be applied in 
every case.  Through a strict application of the Court’s balancing test, the Groveport 
Madison drug-testing program is likely to be upheld.  However, this article has set 
forth several public policy considerations that should be addressed when applying 
the relevant factors in the test and has argued that, after factoring the public policy 
considerations into the test, the balance should weigh against expanding drug-testing 
programs to contexts other than those already upheld by the Court.  Therefore, 
should the Groveport Madison program be challenged in formal litigation, it should 
be struck down due to its implication of so many important public policy concerns. 
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